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Earthly Indigeneity: The Cognitive and Ethical 
Implications of a Disregarded Cosmic Occurrence 
_Abstract 
In any form, ‘being indigenous’ has a relational signification. Therefore, what conse-
quences might there be for a conceptualization of indigenism that recognizes the com-
monality of our being indigenous to the Earth? Could we think of each instance of this 
common tendency to indigenize the Earth as a vernacularization of a universal incli-
nation to produce indigeneity? In this vein, could we infer that indigenization is noth-
ing but the spatial projection of a universal human inclination to engender culture? 
These questions and their implications could have a substantial impact on how we 
conceive of the relationship between indigeneity and space. Taking the idea of ‘earthly 
indigeneity’ seriously means reading every place as an epitome of processive threads 
interwoven through other places and, potentially, originating from every part of the 
earth. If so considered, the ‘fact’ of indigeneity becomes the result of a dynamic pro-
cess carried out through a spectrum of planetary semiotic connections, and guided by 
responsible cognitive action. ‘Ought’ and ‘is,’ the cognitive and the ethical, materiality 
and immateriality, local and global, can be seen to intermingle within indigeneity in a 
transformative orbit around the continually self-respatializing life of culture that could 
be, semiotically speaking, a veritable form of ‘renewable energy.’ 
1_Prologue: Why Am I Not Indigenous? 
I would like to begin this essay by analyzing the simple and somewhat whimsical ques-
tion I offer as a title for this prologue. To this end, let me introduce myself: I was born 
in Sicily, thereby in Italy, to native Italian parents; I do not belong to a decolonized 
territory, nor am I a member of any minority group or ethnicity. I am a legal scholar, 
and a full professor at Parma University. I cannot express any serious complaints about 
my ability to ‘live’ my culture and — flaw of flaws — my professional status ranks 
highly in Western society. 
According to current assumptions about entitlement for claiming indigenous rights, 
there is no chance I would be recognized as indigenous. Certainly, the current concept 
of indigeneity is broader than it once was, as our ideas of indigeneity are no longer 
strictly connected to the misappropriations and plunders perpetrated by European col-
onizers since the dawn of (Western) modernity. Among those subjects legally entitled 
to consider themselves ‘indigenous people’ today are Asian, African, and even some 
European migrant communities or ethnic groups. On the other hand, the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People (UNDRIP) does not provide any defi-
nition of ‘indigeneity,’ and does not reference any particular territories or specific geo-
graphical areas. Traditional knowledge, cultural identity, communitarian self-aware-
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ness rooted in (allegedly) ancestral origins, and so on, constitute the connotative props 
necessary to claim the ‘right’ to be recognized as indigenous. In short, territoriality and 
indigeneity are no longer assumed as necessarily coextensive, although the struggle for 
territory and the related redress are the primary focus of most indigenous peoples’ 
claims. 
Nonetheless, my chances of being recognized as indigenous are pretty much zero to 
none. I would like to explore the reasons underlying this absence of possibility in order 
to better understand the anthropological consistency of the concept of ‘indigeneity’ 
used in political and institutional praxis, at least in recent years. In parallel, I will at-
tempt to probe the degree of influence that political action on behalf of ‘indigenous 
peoples’ has had on the work of anthropologists and their elaborations of the idea of 
‘indigeneity’ more generally. 
Before going any further, however, I want to immediately tip my hand, so to speak. 
By raising the question of my actual potential as a would-be indigenous subject, my 
intent is to ‘call the bluff ’ of the political and historical constraints that currently de-
termine conceptions of the category of ‘indigeneity.’ As a point of departure but also as 
my endpoint, I assume that indigeneity is, actually, a planetary occurrence, completely 
coextensive with the advent of a symbolic-cultural species on the Earth that is prone to 
creatively adapt itself in order to face the massive variety of environmental challenges 
and stimuli. In short, indigeneity should be understood as a ubiquitous expression of 
the ‘cultural nature’ of human beings, and their creative tendency to ‘produce culture’ 
everywhere. 
Although I am a lawyer, or perhaps because I am a lawyer, I think the juridification 
of indigeneity has for the most part had a negative influence on the anthropological 
understanding of this category, a negative influence that has resulted in a pernicious 
conflation between ‘indigenism’ and ‘indigeneity.’ 
2_Indigeneity vs. Indigenism: De-legalizing the Concept of Indigeneity,  
De-colonizing the ‘De-colonial Legal’ Approach to Indigeneity 
The inherent flaw of ‘indigeneity’ as a category coincides, in my view, with its stem-
ming from a context teeming with micro-struggles for survival by actors who have been 
geographically and historically identified. Actually, the backdrop against which this 
category took — political and cultural — center stage was the postmodern criticism of 
colonialism and postcolonialism. The UNDRIP, in the seventh paragraph of its Annex, 
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anchors the motivation behind its provisions to a concern for the historical injustices 
suffered by indigenous people that were caused by colonialism. Hence indigeneity and 
indigenous rights have been intended, even by anthropologists, as two sides of the same 
coin, or at least closely related. This connection is understandable and even wise, given 
the necessity of assuring that the needs and claims of indigenous people are effectively 
met. If and when it listens and gives voice to its weakest subjects, the law is a means 
of redress that cannot be overlooked. Nonetheless, as a remedy for supporting people 
entangled in complicated plights — as many indigenous people have been and continue 
to be — the law sometimes proves to be defective. This is because legal language, 
especially that of positive law, operates within a kind of contradiction. It is a means to 
rule and solve conflicts by the recognition of rights, but also through the imposition of 
duties. In accordance with this dialectical and contrastive structure, subjects and situa-
tions are rigorously analyzed and determined. The ensuing game between parts and 
counterparts induces lawmakers and courts to establish precise requirements identify-
ing which subjects are entitled to rights and which are burdened with specular duties. 
Most likely, this is why the legal recognition of indigenous rights tends to cast historical 
and geographical constraints on indigeneity that predispose it to political use. The re-
sult, however, is that ‘indigeneity’ becomes an instrumental category, whose phenom-
enal aspects and potentialities are overshadowed by a set of specific features that are 
conducive to judicial protection. 
Guilt for the misdeeds of colonizers makes the voice of cultural difference much 
louder and more legitimate in the eyes of international and state jurisdictions. Unfortu-
nately, however, such a psycho-historical vision results in an anthropological analysis 
of ‘indigeneity’ that is too often overly influenced by certain space-time constraints. 
Accordingly, the candidates for being ‘indigenous’, even from a purely anthropological 
point of view, must be non-Western peoples, individuals, or groups who are tied to a 
proven and dated tradition, even if the dynamics involved are cosmopolitan and/or mo-
bile. Past conditions of exploitation by ‘Westerners’ appear to be the ground note that 
legitimizes classification as indigenous, in both anthropological and legal terms. Indi-
geneity, in other words, is latently connoted by difference: difference from the West, its 
individualism, its capitalist/industrial embodiments, and the polluting consequences of 
its exploitations. 
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I think this kind of approach results in an inadvertent conversion of indigeneity-as-
a-fact into indigenism-as-political-strategy. If we address the category ‘indigeneity’ as 
if it were synonymous with ‘indigenism,’ then we can rightly assume that it is a histor-
ically situated category, which originates with contemporary criticism against coloni-
alism and postcolonialism, and aims to redress the injustices, misappropriations, plun-
ders, and displacements suffered by many peoples knocked over by the colonial wave 
and/or marginalized by capitalist world sprawl. I contend, however, that this is an ex-
cessively politicized definition of the experience of ‘indigenizing.’ 
‘Indigenous’ does not only refer to non-modern non-Westerners. Conversely, I think 
that those who produce ‘indigeneity’ constitute instead a much broader group that in-
cludes all those who undertake cultural processes by using symbolic resources to ex-
perience and interplay with the spaces they occupy. 
I fear that the current approach to ‘indigeneity’ is much too political, and inclined 
toward identitarian interests rather than cognitive ones. The main basis for my view is 
that the human species gave course to its first act of ‘indigenization’ concomitantly 
with the initial stages of its dissemination of the Earth. From this perspective, it makes 
little sense to qualify as ‘indigenous’ only those populations pre-existing colonial inva-
sions, or those affected by contemporary acts of displacement or destruction carried out 
by Westerners or Westernized governments and majority groups in the rest of the world. 
Furthermore, the anti-colonialist focus cordons off the experience of indigenization, 
which I view as a universal human attitude, within a sort of conservative frame that 
inconsistently separates it from all that occurred before the colonial era and all that 
might occur in the future. How many people in the precolonial past were displaced or 
conquered by the same populations that later suffered upset and destructions carried 
out by colonizers? How many people in present times undertake, or will do so in the 
future, processes of mobility that lead them to indigenize other spaces, producing un-
precedented cultural-spatial dimensions? Or, rather, did human history as well as hu-
man nature itself definitively stall with the onset of Western modernity, so that restoring 
the world as it was before colonialism and contemporary capitalist devastations would 
be nothing but an eternizing of that presumptive endpoint of history and evolution? 
My guess is that ‘indigenism’ is the normative interpretation of a phenomenon of 
‘indigeneity/indigenization’ whose empirical substance and semantic potentialities are 
far broader than its current political and legal renderings. The normative version is, in 
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my view, highly specious and deeply defective, if only because it is a sign of our ina-
bility as human beings to align our behavior to the due respect of cultural difference as 
such. As a result, unlike some scholars,1 I do not think that the UNDRIP has usefully 
served to distinguish indigenous peoples’ rights from those of all other minorities. Con-
versely, I argue that indigenism is a sort of remedy for a past and present unwillingness 
by the state and local/territorial authorities to give a serious cultural basis to the ideals 
of democratic pluralism. 
I think that indigeneity can only gain its due legal recognition if anthropologists 
make a serious effort to develop the concept through a ‘decolonization’ of its scope, 
and a delegalization of its paths of analysis: that is, a cognitive enfranchisement of its 
legal implementations. A ‘decolonization of indigeneity’ would be one in which an-
thropologists, as well as legal scholars, would work to liberate indigeneity from the 
current ‘decolonizing approach.’ I propose, in other words, that all of us — anthropol-
ogists and lawyers — undertake a dispassionate commitment to enlarge and generalize 
our views of indigenizing experience so as to include all cultural experiences inside its 
semantic borders. Otherwise, if the legal-political mainstream continues to hold its 
dominant position, I fear that the differentialist logic underlying it will end up dialecti-
cally and paradoxically subduing indigenous peoples’ exigencies to the logic of West-
ern cultural and legal patterns. Evidence of the kind of parabola that follows the dia-
lectic differentializing approach can be seen in the regulatory protection of indigenous 
peoples’ traditional knowledge, and its increasing inclination toward the reification/ob-
jectification of cultural experience. The logic of intellectual property protection is per-
vasive even if its real peril does not consist — as many authors warn — in the super-
imposition of individualistic property patterns over traditional ways to keep and use 
knowledge. Rather, the true danger consists in the inevitable ossification of all that is 
to be considered as simulacra of indigenous identity, which will have to demonstrate 
authenticity at an immediate morphological and perceptive level now equated with a 
recognizable and self-evident difference from all that is from the West. On the other 
hand, differentialism embodies an out/out logic that transforms, sooner or later, into a 
drive toward an exclusionary use of space, things, symbols, ideas, etc. The search for 
authenticity, as an instrument to legitimize indigenous claims, gives practical substance 
to the Spinozian motto ‘omnis determinatio est negatio.’2 This is precisely the opposi-
tional logic that tends to locate differences along a continuum, thus concealing the 
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silent imposition of a cultural Procrustes behind the apparent determination and defense 
of ‘indigenous identitarian features.’ Some attempts to configure holistic understand-
ings of intellectual property have been made, so as to align legal protection with indig-
enous cosmological understandings of traditional knowledge.3 But this cannot over-
come the morphological stiffness required if indigeneity is to be considered as a ‘good’ 
endowed with an exclusionary and differentialist regime of legal protection. For better 
or worse, the legal protection of indigeneity requires a high level of determination, and 
this can only take a morphological and objectifying form. 
The trap of a morphologizing and stiffened reading of indigenous culture is alluring, 
on the other hand, even to the representatives of indigenous peoples. Legal provisions 
provide the highest degree of semantic determination when it comes to deciding certain 
conflicts. And it is no coincidence if under the aegis of legal pluralism, the ancestral 
star of indigenous customary law has received, in recent times, significant political and 
academic attention.4 More and more often the legal recognition of indigenous cultures, 
namely of indigeneity, morphs toward the assessment and reception by international or 
state law of the rules produced by customary law. In this way, culture is increasingly 
equated with customary law, so that political and legal agencies look for evidence of 
the cultural authenticity of indigenous claims in their traditional or pre-existing legali-
zation. However much customary law proves to be plastic and fluid, or untainted by 
the rigidity that allegedly affects (the use of) statutory law, cultural habits are always 
different from legal rules, and people are not norms. If the aim of protecting indigeneity 
turns into a dwindling reduction of indigenous cultures into their legal expressions,5 
this means that the price for obtaining recognition of indigenous rights will be the cul-
tural ossification of indigeneity itself. 
The relationships between the varieties of indigeneity and Western cultures or West-
ernized governments actually seem bound to take the shape of inter-legal accommoda-
tions.6 This means that the possibility of achieving some degree of intercultural trans-
lation/transaction is hopeless from the start.7 Indigeneity will have undergone, in this 
case, a double process of objectification and reification: its significance would be cur-
tailed to the point of rigidly equating it to the morphological features of cultural habits, 
the evidence of which is moreover traced to customary legal provisions. Needless to 
say, this is nothing but a further demonstration that oppositional differentialist logic 
inevitably tends toward a homogenizing interpenetration of differences within which 
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the possibility of a mutual creative cultural transaction and co-construction is doomed 
to be supplanted by a formal homologation, achieved through semantic amputations 
and instrumental/utilitarian shortsighted compromises. 
Following from the above, an (at least) interlocutory de-legalized approach to indi-
geneity, coupled with a reading of indigenous rights less obsessively driven by the post-
modern (Western) ‘decolonizing mission,’ constitutes an essential step towards a gen-
uine intercultural and polyphonic harmonization of all the experiences to which the 
human attitude to indigenize gives rise, and canopies beneath itself. 
3_Noetic Cultural Ciphers and the Dynamic Spatialization of  
Cultures: Beyond the Oppositional Relationality of Indigeneity 
Indigeneity is a direct implication of the spatializing work of culture. If we consider 
culture as a dynamic set of signs, then we must appreciate that this set has practical 
consequences. This means that culture unfolds through and with space. Through its 
spatial projections, it transforms space and its components into instruments of signifi-
cation. Space itself is not something placed out there, something that can be grasped 
by the human body/mind unit as a simple self-evident datum. Conversely, it is always 
a result of the dynamic interaction between this unit (which is however a relational 
emergence) and its environment. In this sense, we can say that a ‘void space’ does not 
exist as an absolute experienced reality; rather ‘void spatiality’ is, in every case, an 
open horizon of semantic/practical possibilities, which are culturally, even if vaguely, 
determined. This is because in semiotic terms, spaces and categories horizontally inter-
act along a connotative/signical or chorological continuum: there is no representation 
of space without categorization and no categorization without spatial projections (be 
they virtual or effective).8 Such a semiotic approach allows us to overcome the mind/ 
world, culture/nature, symbolic dimension/spatial dimension, material/immaterial di-
vides. All of these assume, conversely, only a heuristic and instrumental signification, 
extremely important operationally, but devoid of ontological connotations. 
From a semiotic perspective, cultural space is a proactive production through which 
living beings actively co-produce their environment. However, all living beings, and 
humans especially, elaborate signs through symbolic memory, which endows them with 
the ability to presentify past experiences and their semiotic traces so as to face present 
environmental challenges. This is the reason all words, images, practices, and habits 
are to be intended as both epitomes of past experiences and proactive projections of 
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their future implications. The local, from this perspective and insofar as it is involved 
in human experience, is intrinsically ubiquitous and is interwoven with a multi-sited 
signical and relational space. Despite possible appearances, such an understanding of 
space is anything but an abstraction. It displays, instead, spatialities actually lived by 
living beings to a much greater extent, as they are symbolic and cultural creatures. 
Territory and territorialities can thus be understood as a form of semantization of 
spatial experience, powered by the universal attitude of human beings to produce and 
transmit culture. Both the categories ‘territory’ and/or ‘territorial’ are therefore products 
of this cultural work, which, in setting the coordinates of local experience, always in-
cludes signical devices deriving from somewhere else. In this sense, all indigenous ex-
periences are in some sense heterochthonous. This is the mobile and trans-local rhythm 
of ‘territorialization’ that punctuates the human planetary enterprise. I would propose, 
then, to term the trans-epochal development of this multi-vocal and omnipresent activ-
ity ‘indigenization,’ and to use ‘indigeneity’ as the term for its (interlocutory and rela-
tively) localizable results. 
The gist of any experience of ‘indigeneization’ is the production/invention of a ter-
ritory (or place), which is thus a synthesis of the co-generative relationships between 
mind and space, immateriality and materiality. Territory embodies human presence in 
space, and human bodies proactively internalize space.9 These paths of experience have 
a semiotic equivalent, in some sense isomorphic to their pragmatic projections, in what 
we can call ‘noetic ciphers.’10 They correspond to the processing sequences that the 
human attitude to produce culture has elaborated throughout the ubiquitous activities 
of indigenization. Noetic ciphers never have absolute pertinence to only one territory 
or place. They are, conversely, local and cosmopolitan at the same time, just like the 
story of humankind’s presence on the Earth. In this sense, we can say that the division 
between indigeneity and cosmopolitanism is a false dichotomy, in part because today 
indigenous people are also on the move, and ‘give place’ to hybridizing contacts with 
other people in places different from those of their origin.11 We can see the mark of 
cosmopolitanism within the cognitive core of all indigenous experience.12 Moreover, I 
think it is precisely the semiotic ubiquity of the human cognitive attitude that should 
be at the center of a planetary ethics of ‘indigeneities.’ Such an ethics would be no 
different from that necessary to negotiate cultural differences — through mutual 
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recognition/pollination — because there is no cultural experience without attendant 
processes of spatialization and, thereby, indigenization. 
In this regard, I would like to emphasize that the territory13 involved in, and pro-
duced by, all processes of indigeneization should be distinguished from the physical 
concept of territory/land. If we embrace a semiotic approach to cultural experience, 
then territory will correspond to the real space engendered by flows of information and 
their relationships. It should not come as a surprise, therefore, if people craft spatial 
dimensions of indigeneity that do not correspond to geo-physical land boundaries. Ter-
ritories or places, in cultural terms, should be understood as points of confluence for 
complex semiotic streams, of which the material/terrestrial components are only an 
aspect; the “land” is thus to be considered central or not according to its relational sig-
nificance, rather than its materiality. Recalling the question opening this essay, the ter-
ritory of ‘Sicilianity’ is something that is now impossible to situate in a specific physi-
cal/geographical place or territory. 
From this perspective, even the issue of origins — so often disputed when referenc-
ing the cosmopolitanization of indigeneity — undergoes a sort of dialectical inter-spa-
tial transfiguration. Take, for example, one of the worst, even if sadly world-renowned, 
expressions of Sicilian indigeneity: the Mafia.14 During the migrations from Italy to the 
US in the late 19th century, it was born as a cultural reaction against the unification of 
Italy under the northern Savoy Dynasty, subsequently re-placing itself in America, and 
becoming the criminal organization ‘Cosa Nostra.’ Filled with traditional or even an-
cestral habits, in the new location the Mafia transformed so deeply that it eventually 
became a sort of beacon for its members still living in Sicily. In fact, when the Allied 
Forces invaded Sicily during World War II, they benefitted from the transnational sup-
port of Cosa Nostra and the Sicilian Mafia, something that vastly improved the sprawl-
ing expansion of these criminal organizations. In the aftermath of the War, the spatial 
coordinates of the Mafia/Cosa Nostra became inter-spatial; the territory of this now 
international organization changed its original location and in a sense, became ubiqui-
tous to such an extent that even Italians now use the terms ‘Cosa Nostra’ and ‘Mafia’ 
indifferently to refer to the same phenomena spreading all over the world.15 
I use the example of the Mafia to provocatively draw attention to the possibility that 
indigeneity, in all its possible forms, is a worldwide occurrence, intrinsically dynamic 
and capable of trans-local territorializations (spatialized semantizations of cultural 
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experience). On the other hand, the culturally indigenous connotations of Cosa Nostra, 
as well as ‘Drangheta, Camorra, etc., are well known by criminal police all over the 
world. Without a nuanced understanding of the behavioral habits embodied in their 
actions by the affiliated members of such organizations, it is almost impossible to pre-
vent their criminal activities. At the same time, the code of their communication and 
practical actions now has multi-sited origins, and corresponds to a territorial dimension 
that does not coincidence with national borders or geo-political areas. 
The observations offered so far show, once more, the necessity of moving the issue 
of indigeneity beyond the ‘West versus Rest of World’ polarization that results from 
contemporary assessments of the colonial and postcolonial dynamics of destruction and 
exploitation. Even if colonialism had never taken place, indigeneity would have had its 
place in the field of anthropological, political and legal analyses, with its intrinsic his-
torical dimensions. On the other hand, there is no culture on the planet Earth that does 
not include a degree of knowledge that comes from some ‘elsewhere,’ and even as local 
cultural experience it re-elaborates those migrant sets of information in an idiomatic 
way, and spatializes them in and through its specific territorial dimension. Consequen-
tially, the process of the recognition of indigeneity should be multi-centered and should 
focus, if it hopes to be genuine, not so much on the morphological features or products 
of culture as on the processing of cultural/adaptive solutions, so as to understand and 
recognize their noetic elaborative ciphers. When so conceived, all ‘indigeneity’ will 
become cognitively universal and cosmopolitan. In its noetic ciphers, in its idiomatic 
attitude to elaborate signical relationships along a path of creative semiosis — that is, 
the process through which the brain/body units engender new meanings and vital meth-
ods — all cultures can mirror themselves and learn, in comparative/reflexive terms, 
something about the significance of their own habits. 
A genuinely pluralistic understanding of indigeneity, that is, of the processes of spa-
tialization in the human attitude to produce culture, should newly reveal the ubiquitous 
plasticity of the symbolic/pragmatic functions inherent in our humanity. This is the 
same capacity that binds and relates different cultural productions, and is behind the 
universal inclination to produce culture. In turn, the relational ubiquity of cultural ex-
perience, when considered with respect to its noetic ciphers, would result in a poly-
phonic and multi-centered indigeneity.16 
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Relationality, on the other hand, is also at the core of the self-consciousness of one’s 
own indigeneity. The ‘indigenous’ can become aware of their indigeneity only when 
they can look at themselves in the mirror of an alterity that is both cultural and geo-
graphical (or better: spatial).17 Ones’ own indigeneity, in other words, is in any case the 
outcome of a reflexive action triggered by the encounter with alterity. Were such alter-
ity absolutely absent, one would be unable to conceive ones’ own indigeneity. In the 
same vein, searching for an authentic indigeneity would not make sense if there were 
no contact with the Other. People discover their own indigeneity and its authenticity in 
connection with, and because of, their relations with Others. Hence, indigeneity cannot 
be said to be ‘authentic’ because of its direct coincidence or compliance with an origi-
nal. This apparently paradoxical occurrence depends on whether the ‘original indige-
nous’ results from an encounter with Otherness. Indigeneity, by implication, can be 
continually reauthenticated through further encounters with other various alterities.18 
In this way, the most authentic indigeneity will always be the last, that is, the one re-
maining after a cumulative sequence of indigeneities have been determined, the out-
come of a series of encounters with Otherness. In the end, we could even imagine that 
there will be many versions of one’s own indigeneity, as various encounters with Oth-
erness occur. In any case, these manifold indigeneities do not dwell inside everyone or 
each group in a parallel way. They reciprocally contaminate, cumulate, and conflate. 
The above considerations lead us to relativize the exclusiveness of physical territory 
as a connotative and structural feature of indigeneity. Spatial projections of culture en-
gender their own spaces, that is, the invention of many, various territories. But cultural 
spatializations and their territorial elaborations are semiotic dimensions that do not nec-
essarily saturate the physical space. A single physical place can be traversed and inter-
actively lived by many cultural spaces and experiences as well as their related territo-
rializations. Spatial incompatibility among different cultures does not depend on the 
Leibnizian axiom in which two bodies cannot occupy the same space. Instead, if it 
occurs, such incompatibility is a semantic one; it comes from the lack of transla-
tion/transaction between the semantic connotations of the different spatializations pro-
actively drawn by the various cultural categorizations at play. 
All the above argumentative steps seek to address the overlapping interplay of mul-
tiple indigeneities in both urban and rural contexts.19 My idea is that the autonomy and 
the self-determination of indigenous peoples and their cultures is achievable by 
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combining their conservation and their self-transformation through practices of sym-
metrical recognition and harmonization with all the ‘other indigeneities’ (namely cul-
tural spatializations) of the world. In this direction, it is not physical isolation that will 
preserve indigeneity but rather the potential to share material space by ensuring differ-
ent cultural subjectivities the possibility to creatively produce culture and reciprocally 
translate/transact their spatial projections. This does not preclude the fact that, in some 
cases, sole occupation of a territory could be the best way to assure cultural indigenous 
self-determination. This solution, however, should only be the final outcome of a se-
mantic intercultural effort of translation/transaction between the noetic ciphers encap-
sulated in the cultural habits and morphological expressions of all the cultures aspiring 
to live in a specific place, urban or rural. 
In saying this, I do not wish to underplay the injustices suffered by people displaced 
from their lands and dispersed throughout the world as a consequence of colonial dev-
astations/dispossessions and capitalistic exploitations of Others’ living spaces, driven 
by a compulsory greed for self-enrichment. These tragedies exist and deserve mean-
ingful redress. Nonetheless, I would like to warn against a formalistic use of the ‘terri-
tory/self-determination’ argumentative categorical couple. In many cases, the legaliza-
tion of indigenous claims has spurred people to assert that their ancestral rights come 
directly from the land because this land and its cosmological significance dictate their 
customary law. These kinds of claims, above all if recognized in the name of a plural-
istic normative conception of cultural difference, run the risk of giving course to an 
instrumental use of an indigenist argument dramatically doomed to turn into an exclu-
sionary war for power over material space. 
Although my following assertions may sound rather provocative anthropologically 
speaking, I have to say that territory in itself, if considered as material space, does not 
emanate any law.20 I think that there is nothing holistic in the attempt to root law in the 
land. On the contrary, and despite appearances, the rooting assertion enshrines a dual-
istic division between the nature/thing and cultural/symbolic dimensions. Human be-
ings and territories, conversely, are inseparable because, from the perspective of their 
significance, culture and ways of spatialization are indistinguishable. Conceptualiza-
tions of spaces engender territories, which in turn can be recognized as sources of law. 
At the onset of this process there is a continuum between nature and culture, and this 
is to be recognized for indigenous people as well as for Westerners and other cultures. 
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In my view, the real problem does not lie in the territory itself and its attribution or re-
attribution to indigenous people. What should be preserved is the possibility to main-
tain and re-elaborate the noetic ciphers that join a specific culture to the territory that it 
engendered through its original, idiomatic experience of space. Actually, remaining in 
a territory or recovering a territory that no longer allows the implementation and self-
transformation of those noetic/cultural ciphers does not make sense from the perspec-
tive of a genuine protection of indigeneity. This elementary observation shows how 
groundless it is to assert that law emanates from the land. As already observed above, 
territory or land is not a datum but rather is always the cultural result of experience and 
its inherent categorizations. 
What has been elaborated so far, however, in no way undermines, but could instead 
even strengthen the right to claim redress for territory and its traditional use, at least in 
some cases. What I mean is that assuming the right to territory as an implication of the 
right to indigenous difference in itself, and therefore without any justification or at-
tempt to translate its cultural ciphers interculturally, is merely an expression of an idol-
atrous war waged for physical space taken as an external entity — albeit instrumentally 
and ex-post crammed with wildly various symbologies. This would be nothing but a 
morphological/materialistic approach to the human inclination to territorialize/catego-
rize space and experience. But such a view is as immediate as it is deleterious, even if 
it might appear to be endowed with a sort of dazzling obviousness, such that it becomes 
a source of legitimation for indigenous claims; if nothing else, it looks like the opposite 
to the usurping territorialization/categorization superimposed by the colonizing West 
and its so-called advanced civilization. Nonetheless this is only an equal and opposite 
reaction, which westernizes Others, the indigenous, precisely by inducing them to ob-
jectify and ‘reify’ their culture by assuming the land as its axis. The materialized terri-
tory induces the clinging of indigenous hopes to the illusion that it can preserve their 
culture and avert its end. But I fear that this would be a deeply mistaken approach. 
Conservation for its own sake would paradoxically relativize indigenous cultures and 
crystallize their noetic dynamic sources: just a prelude to a future passively undertaken 
and out of any cognizant control.21 
International and state rules providing for the participation and consent of indige-
nous people22 in all the decisions potentially affecting their interests will serve little 
purpose if indigeneity is not expressed with reference to its noetic cultural motor, its 
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capacity to self-transform and remain itself through and by virtue of its self-transfor-
mations. If indigeneity is not recognized and treated according to the inherent signifi-
cance of culture, that is, as a source of renewing and renewable semiotic energy, today’s 
material indigenous victories will soon turn into tomorrow’s increasing ineluctable cul-
tural ossification. 
Against this danger, it could be observed that UNDRIP includes the ‘right to de-
velop’ in many of its provisions: see Articles 11, 13, 23, 26.2, 31, and in several of the 
considerata included in the related Annex, for example. Nevertheless, the general aura 
of the Declaration and the bent of the legal implementation23 of its guiding principles 
seem to be pervaded by a prevailing misoneism and conservative spirit. It is possible 
that future interpretations of this document will enhance the semantic implications of 
the term ‘develop.’ For this to happen, however, the change that needs to take place 
should directly involve a retooled idea of indigeneity, as well as a conflation between 
‘ought’ and ‘being’ which includes a global, multifocal and polyphonic recognition. 
4_The Convergence of ‘Ought’ and ‘Is’ in the Cognitive Significance  
of Indigeneity: A Path to the Dynamic Harmonization of Indigeneity’s  
Protection and the Intercultural Use of Human Rights 
My basic assumption is that indigeneity is a projection of the human attitude to produce 
culture, followed by the attendant cultural engendering of spaces. All experiences of 
indigeneization, in this view, could be considered as targets or extensional projections 
of the ‘indigeneization of the Earth.’ According to this view of human cultural action, 
‘Earthly Space’ should be considered as an absolute or comprehensive metaphor for all 
past, present and future experiences of indigeneization. So that it is, in a sense, the 
alpha and the omega, the original pattern and the semantic (future) synthesis of human 
presence on the Earth. 
Against this backdrop, we could define in cognitive terms the reciprocal recognition 
of all ‘indigeneities’ and their actual and virtual spatial projections. My argument is as 
follows: if each indigeneity stems from a universal human function, the ‘production of 
culture and space,’ then all indigeneities will feature noetic ciphers that reveal some-
thing about human cultural nature and the different ways of engendering an all-encom-
passing ‘Earthly Space.’ Recognition requires respect and dialogue; but dialogue, in 
turn, presupposes the possibility to exist and express oneself. If the manifold indigeni-
zations are variations of the universal attitude to produce and semantize space, then 
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each of these experiences can teach something to the others and their human actors 
about their sense of Earthly enterprise. A refusal of this kind of learning can result in 
the physical and cultural genocide of indigenous targets, and of course also effects a 
self-defeating lack of self-knowledge. I would like to propose calling this condition a 
‘defective embodiment of earthly indigeneity.’ From this perspective, recognition of 
Otherness is an activity that simultaneously pertains to both the realms of ‘ought’ and 
‘is.’ It could be taken as a value or an end, but at the same time and insofar as it is 
embodied in current experience, it deploys itself as a means of knowledge. Our under-
standing of what earthly indigeneity ‘is,’ namely, our terrestrial Being, is a consequence 
of the act of recognizing Others. But, most importantly, this means that (human) Being 
depends, at least to a considerable extent, on what humans know about the interactions 
between themselves and the world. Through the spectrum of ‘indigeneity,’ then, ‘ought’ 
and ‘is’ show a tendency to converge. This tendency toward cognitive convergence 
should be assumed as a renewed ground for elaborating the overall discourse on indig-
enous rights. 
From this perspective, I would like to return to the term ‘noetic cipher’ to better 
describe its significance and function. To begin, we can observe that all cultural prod-
ucts are semiotic-experiential syntheses of the interplay between mind, body, and the 
environment. What ultimately connotes this interactive process does not coincide with 
its final form or perceptive properties. These are only contingent expressions of a pro-
cess, an experiential habit at work.24 The inner significance of cultural products consists 
precisely in the compositional ciphers, namely in the noetic and behavioral patterns of 
adaptive adjustment underlying the birth of the ‘thing’ (objects, conducts, symbolic 
expressions, etc.). Given that space is not distinguishable from the experiences and 
objects that populate and punctuate it, and furthermore, that indigenization can be as-
sumed as the meta-category for the human semantization of space and environment, 
then all indigeneities should be understood and recognized through the noetic ciphers 
they include as a means of producing related and idiomatic spatial cultural experience. 
Noetic ciphers are habits, processive schemas of adaptation, that only occasionally 
coincide with specific things, objects, physical territories, and so on. These and their 
external manifestations are projections, and consequences, but they do not exhaust in 
themselves all the significance of the noetic ciphers from which they stem. On the con-
trary, such noetic ciphers hold an inner attitude to be metaphorically ‘transduced’ and 
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implemented by the use of other material and spatial components. For example, a rein-
deer fur is a very useful garment if I am in Sweden or Finland during the winter; con-
versely, it would be a kind of torture device were I to wear it on a summer’s day in the 
middle of the Saharan desert. The noetic cipher of ‘wearing garments’ can, however, 
remain the same in both locations and be recognized as such, notwithstanding the pref-
erable choice of wearing a linen tunic in the Sahara Desert, for example. Paradoxically, 
if I were Swedish or Finnish, and determined to wear the reindeer fur also in the Sahara 
Desert so as to maintain my cultural indigenous roots, precisely by maintaining the 
morphological and objectified connotations of my habits, I would invalidate their sig-
nificance. 
When we think of the intercultural recognition of indigeneity, we have to assume 
the possibility of a multilateral understanding of the noetic ciphers at work in all the 
habits embodied by people who are party to the intercultural encounter.25 What must 
be avoided are the morphological reification and objectification of one’s own cultural 
noetic cipher as well as the tendency to reciprocally translate by means of the alleged 
discovery of functionalist equivalences.26 It must be made clear: the intercultural trans-
lation/transaction between different noetic ciphers should always be carried out as an 
original act of cultural creation.27 Which connotations are to be selected in order to 
serve as a metaphorical ground for intercultural understanding and interplay between 
different indigeneities/cultures cannot be unilaterally or aprioristically identified. It is 
primarily for this reason that functionalism does not work. It usually proceeds through 
the identification of a particular set of connotations and uses them to support the idea 
that the common end shared by different cultural habits and their material expressions 
is a specific one. In most cases, we observe a tendency to convert Otherness into a 
regime that is compatible with one’s own habits, obviously accompanied by the unfail-
ing pervasive action of an ethnocentric gaze. Conversely, a genuine intercultural un-
derstanding requires a holistic and dynamic appreciation of the noetic and contextual 
components underlying the cultural habits and subjectivities being compared. At the 
same time, the cultural subjects’ freedom to choose what to leave behind and what to 
acquire through the process of intercultural transduction must be assured. 
Against the foil of ‘Earthly indigeneity,’ a polyphonic dialogue between the different 
indigeneity and indigeneization operations in action on our planet could be designated 
an ‘inter-indigenization process.’ This is — I argue — an existential task for human-
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kind, one that recognizes that each culture contains noetic ciphers of adaptation to the 
earthly environment that could be helpful to understanding the sense of and future pos-
sibilities for human life on Earth. 
The inherent translatability and transducibility of indigenous existential approaches 
is proven, on the other hand, by the legal regime — specifically as applied to intellec-
tual property — provided and in some cases already jurisdictionally implemented to 
protect so-called indigenous and traditional knowledge. If this knowledge and its prac-
tical/objectifying implications are viewed, in the eyes of the same modern culture, to 
have universal utility, then why on earth would it need to be protected by intellectual 
property law? I raise this question even if it blatantly demonstrates a deep inconsis-
tency. For what sense does it make, from a perspective of all-encompassing Earthly 
indigeneity, to assume that knowledge of universal significance can be ruled by a legal 
regime that allows for its exclusionary use and/or economic exploitation? This paradox 
and its constitutive elements, I contend, should be seen as the problematic kernel nes-
tled within current conceptualizations and implementations of indigenism and indige-
nous peoples’ rights. I think that until we humans understand that the main task within 
the need to recognize the value of indigeneity is the very cognitive function on which 
our existence on the Earth depends, then all political and legal attempts to assure indig-
enous rights will devolve into a self-destructive logic of appropriation and power, in-
volving westernized cultures as much as indigenous ones. This is not a direct conse-
quence of the individualistic quality of the western concept of intellectual property, as 
it is so often argued. As matter of fact, Western iterations of private property also rec-
ognize many possibilities for collectivization, multi-personal use, functionalization to 
communitarian interests and values, and so on. To make use of these semantic varia-
tions of the Western idea of property within the spectrum of an intercultural translation 
of indigenous claims for territories, traditional knowledge, etc., global thought must 
wriggle free from identitarian and reifying conceptions of culture.28 Examples of the 
inconsistent and culturally dissociative behaviors that an inadequate understanding of 
noetic ciphers underlying indigenous habits29 provokes can be found, among the myr-
iad of similar cases, in two different stories respectively related to the Nuaulu people 
of South Asia30 and the Kantu’ of Kalimatan.31 
I observed something similar during my fieldwork in Calabria, specifically in Riace, 
where a project for the repopulation of local villages was carried out by means of a plan 
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of integration for migrants/refugees and the parallel recovery of traditional autochtho-
nous knowledge and habits. Unfortunately, though the initial efforts were carried out 
with genuine inventiveness, the attempt to merge and co-pollinate Calabrian East Coast 
traditional knowledge and the cultural habits of new arrivals broke up on the reefs of 
economic, political and media exploitation of this social experiment. By and by, the 
focus on noetic ciphers and the possibility of their intercultural transduction/transaction 
lost its central positioning, and was eventually replaced by economic and identitarian 
accommodations between the interests of the natives and the foreign newcomers.32 
The importance of centering the recognition and protection of indigeneity on its no-
etic ciphers is also proven by the current trend for harmonizing indigenous habits/be-
haviors and human rights. Ordinarily, the cultural differentiation of indigenous people 
is ruled by a double-faceted standard of self-determination/compatibility, which places 
— as dialectical poles — indigenous habits on one side, and state statutory law/inter-
national human rights regimes on the other. The tendency to interpret the relationships 
between indigenous cultures and the other cultures in identitarian terms leads to a read-
ing of indigeneity that primarily orbits around the morphological features of peoples’ 
conduct.33 These morphological features, then, are taken as indices to calculate their 
compatibility with human rights. At the same time, indigenous people try to include 
their claims to differentiate and self-determine their identities, taken in their material 
and practical consequences, under the semantic dome of human rights. No attempt at 
semantic translation takes place in these wars over the signification and guarantee im-
plications of human rights enunciations. In these semantic struggles, there is no trace-
able justification of differences; rather they are presented as self-bounded units to be 
considered as such, for their (alleged) empirical givenness. Needless to say, within this 
contrastive game, human rights can only play the role of imposing hierarchical stand-
ards, which are thereby dangerously exposed to political instrumentalization. 
On the contrary, if the starting point of the protection of indigeneity focused instead 
on the noetic ciphers of the cultural parties at play, then the axiological connotations of 
human rights could be situated in the midst of the translational/transactive process so 
as to foster the collaborative creation of intercultural solutions. If all parties considered 
themselves as equal and full-fledged interpreters of different indigeneities, they could 
trace, in the connotative landscapes underlying their habits, the semantic components 
to use for calling into play human rights as translational interfaces. In this way, human 
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rights could leave their hierarchical pyramidal positioning, and instead locate them-
selves on a horizontal plane, where they could function as a semantic bridge between 
different cultural and spatial universes.34 
This intercultural use of human rights could give rise to the production of inter-
spatial translations and therefore create new inter-spaces of experience, which in each 
specific place could give shape to a general formula of coexistence between indigene-
ities amenable to be implemented at an all-encompassing Earthly level. Rather than 
being trapped in a claiming/compensatory, reifying and anti-Western script, the dis-
course on indigeneity should endorse and include the view that, at least in absolute 
terms, there is no better or worse way to live on — and supported by — the Earth. It is 
true, colonialism and, more recently, the combination of contemporary technology and 
neocolonialism have caused and continue to cause great ecological changes and imbal-
ances in bio-diversity. But human presence on Earth has also produced huge catastro-
phes in the past, especially if we consider human action from a deeply ecological point 
of view.35 There is no indigenous people that is completely innocent if judged from this 
perspective. Human beings, as well as other creatures, are part and parcel of transfor-
mations that nature impresses on itself; this simply because the human being is itself 
nature, beyond and notwithstanding all possible dualisms. We should consider — with 
an appreciation for the paradox — that a conservative and museifying misoneism was 
born under modernity, and it cannot alter the trans-epochal process of cosmic signifi-
cation that the appearance of humankind on Earth assumes. I argue that we, the humans, 
should modestly come to terms with this impossibility and, at the same time, with the 
innumerable and unforeseeable variations that the attitude to ‘indigenize’ space pro-
duces in all times. This is a task that can no longer exempt anyone from its accomplish-
ment. Therefore, invoking the universal logic of human rights only to see the triumph 
of unilateral or conservative/identitarian claims for redress is a contradiction that can-
not long survive its consequences. In the human creative production of earthly spatial-
ities, we must act all together, polyphonically, from the common understanding — even 
visually proffered by images from outer space — that the Earth is finite. 
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